SDWatch | Publication

Water Governance and Water Management in the Aral Sea Basin: Challenges and Opportunities from the Perspective of Kazakhstan


Water represents a crucial finite resource in the world, whose scarcity and uneven distribution at local, national and international level cause serious impacts and challenges at an environmental, social and economic scale, hindering human potential and sustainability. For this reason, at present, water management and governance have become a fundamental issue for governments and international institutions in order to face a global water crisis.

Indeed, estimates suggest that 2 billion people suffer from a permanent shortage of water. It is predicted to exceed 4 billion within the next decades of the 21st century in a permanent context of resource’s uneven distribution.

Several areas in the world face problems of water sharing. With a focus on transboundary basin patterns, the essay will stress the main environmental challenges in the area of Aral Sea Basin, in Central Asia. Being one of the most important water sources in Central Asia, essential for 35 million people inhabiting the region, Aral Sea transboundary area is characterised by several potential risks and challenges at environmental and socio-political level. Indeed, high levels of salinization and desertification hinder the ecological, socio-economic and human development. Moreover, the involvement of different users and uses in a transboundary context feed socio-political potentials of conflict, which may be addressed by cooperation strategies. The focus of the analysis will be, then, on how Kazakhstan, as the most influential country of the area, is actually facing water management challenges.

The Aral Sea Basin

Extending over an estimated 1.5 million square kilometres, the Aral Sea Basin covers a large portion of Central Asia (UNEP 2014). As stated by the World Bank (1998, p.1), the Aral Sea Basin is made up of the primary Aral Sea water body, as well as two main rivers located in the north and south of the basin: the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya rivers, respectively. Labelled as the “heartland of Central Asia” due to its strategic location and large size, the basin spans several countries including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan and Iran (Micklin 2014, p. 19). The focus throughout this paper will be on the impacts that the environmental degradation of the Aral Sea Basin has on Kazakhstan specifically, although all of these countries have a stake in the basin’s outcome. With a basin population of approximately 60 million, actions and decisions regarding water use and water management within the Aral Sea Basin can evidently have a large impact (UNEP 2014).

Unfortunately, the extent of this influence was discovered in the 1960s, following the desiccation and excessive salinisation of the Aral Sea as a result of heavy irrigation that took place within the basin’s grounds (Micklin 2014, p.2). As mentioned by Micklin (2014, p. 2), this resulted in 85% – 95% of the Aral Sea drying up, ultimately leading to the water body separating into four disconnected sections and decreasing dramatically in total volume. Letolle & Mainguet (1998, p. 129) highlight how humans have been the main factor behind the basin’s desertification and, with such a damaging process transpiring within the basin, the inhabitants of the region have faced severe environmental, social and economic impacts.

The impact of the degradation of the Aral Sea on the health and social development of the local population has been profound. The irrigation that took place within the basin brought in various pesticides, salts, fertilisers and chemicals which polluted the waters, exposing the inhabitants of the region to chemicals that could potentially cause rather serious health issues (Micklin, 2014, p. 3). Small, Van Der Meet & Upshur (2001, p. 547) also mention that in addition to the toxicity of the water, chemicals and salts were also airborne and reached the banks of the river and the land itself, contaminating the land vegetation and terrestrial ecosystems. The resulting serious health issues have included diseases such as typhoid and tuberculosis, as well as various digestive and respiratory illnesses (Micklin 2014, p.3). A problem that presented itself within the region regarding these issues was the lack of quality medical services able to provide patients with appropriate treatment for these illnesses (Small, Van Der Meet & Upshur, 2001, p. 547). With such extreme contamination occurring, a very important water and food source for the local population was eliminated, which poses a very serious health risk that threatens human development within this region.

Source: Aramcoworld(2015)

The economic consequences of such environmental damage placed the Central Asian region in a difficult financial situation. The loss of biodiversity and the destruction of numerous ecological systems within the Aral Sea severely affected the economy (Micklin, 2014, pp. 2-3). Water is of utmost importance within this dry region with “economic activity…heavily dependent on extensive irrigation” (Micklin 2014, p. 21). This places a strong dependence on the water being of optimal quality, but as the basin deteriorated this water source was no longer reliable and, as a result, the economically valuable freshwater species previously inhabiting the region were lost (Micklin, 2014). Micklin (2014, p. 2) highlights that several fishing industries were severely affected, eliminating a source of food and money for the locals of the basin area and leaving many without employment.

Lioubimtseva (2015, p. 726) summarises the basin’s situation well by highlighting that the extreme pollution, demand for freshwater, and basin degradation are “among the key water stress and food security-related issues that already threaten human development and security of the Aral Sea basin countries”. Many management programs, agreements and strategies have been adopted since the degradation began in the 1960s in order to tackle these issues and restore the basin to its full potential. These will be of focus within the following sections of this document.

Institutions of Water Governance and Management

While the Aral Sea Basin was entirely under the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) until the USSR dissolved in 1992, it is now governed by the respective governments of the five main countries involved, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan (Granit, et al. 2010, p. 10). There are several management levels for the governance of the Aral Sea Basin, such as international/multilateral, bilateral, and state level.

The World Bank has been involved in infrastructure development in the Aral Sea region as a large-scale international organization for the past almost 25 years (World Bank 2011, p. 2). The Aral Sea Basin Programme covers six components meant to “reduce risks posed by the Chardara dam and improve water delivery, distribution, and basin wide water use efficiency” (World Bank 2011, p. 4). The program objective is “securing the existence of Northern Aral Sea and improving the ecological/environmental conditions in the delta area and around the sea leading to improved human and animal health and biodiversity” (World Bank 2011, p. iii). One of the benefits of working with large international organizations is the opportunity for financial support to complete important development projects, whereas there may be a reluctance of each country to contribute scarce financial resources to a project intended for common good. The World Bank loaned $62.5 million to Kazakhstan for Phase One of the Syr Darya Control & Northern Aral Sea Project (World Bank 2011, p. i).

Another critical multilateral agreement is the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), which formed in Almaty in 1992 and includes input from all five Central Asian States (World Bank 2011, p. 2). The ICWC was created in the “Agreement on cooperation in joint management, use and protection of interstate sources of water resources” (Volovik 2011, p. 5). This forum for water management discussion led to an agreement on “the sharing of hydropower benefits” between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan signed in 1998 (World Bank 2011, p. 2). Kyrgyzstan, as an upstream country, controls a significant amount of hydropower created by dams in the Upper Syr Darya basin (Granit, et al. 2010, p. 6). The agreement obligates Kyrgyzstan to allow “Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to share equally in the purchasing of summer hydropower,” while these two countries will pay Kyrgyzstan in “cash, coal, or gas” (Granit, et al. 2010, p. 11).

Bilateral agreements, or pacts mutually created by two states, also play an important role in the maintenance of the Aral Sea Basin. Kazakhstan worked with their neighbor, China, in 2001 to determine a structure for “Cooperation in Use and Protection of Transboundary Rivers” (Volovik 2011, p. 14). China and Kazakhstan share many transboundary rivers including the Ili and the Irtysh, which are critical to Kazakhstan’s “agricultural and industrial development” (Granit, et al. 2010, p.17). However, China, located upstream of Kazakhstan, was utilizing a disproportionate amount of water resources (Granit, et al. 2010, p. 17). The two states were able to outline an agreement where “no country shall limit the other country in the rational use and protection of the water resources of transboundary rivers” (Volovik 2011, p. 14).

Institutions for water management also exist on a national level within Kazakhstan’s government. Kazakhstan “suffers the most from the effects of inadequate integrated international river basin management” and, in the opinion of the Kazakh government, this will “limit the country’s growth potential” (World Bank 2011, p. 2). This is the reasoning the government used to convince the World Bank to partner with them for a project about the restoration of the North Aral Sea (World Bank 2011, p. 2). Kazakhstan’s government pursues initiatives using national resources and infrastructure, like regional basin councils meant to mediate stakeholder agreements (Granit, et al. 2010, p. 19). Government institutions, such as the Ministry of Environment Protection, and Kazakhstan Water Partnership, play an important role in Kazakhstan’s ability to manage its water use (Granit, et al. 2010, p. 19).

Source: Cawater info (2017)

Crucial Aspects of Water Management in Kazakhstan

After depicting the institutional context of water management and governance related to Aral Sea Basin in the overall Central Asia, the attention will be focused on Kazakhstan as one of the main actors involved.

The Republic of Kazakhstan, the largest of the Central Asian Republics and the largest landlocked country in the world, accounts an area of 2,7 millions km2 and a population of 17,9 million (FAO, 2016 estimate). Kazakhstan represents a crucial actor in Aral Sea Basin transboundary interactions and one of the main promoters of water management policies in Central Asia. (FAO, 2016).Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the main actors which can gain the most benefits from the Aral sea’s flow. However, this geographical location leads Kazakhstan to directly face several environmental challenges, all mutually dependent, which threaten sustainable development: water scarcity, land degradation, desertification, pollution and draining of water and soil, as stressed by the Asian Development Bank (Saigal, 2003, p. 4).

All of these challenges require efforts by Kazakhstan in the design and implementation of water management policies at local, national and international scales. Indeed, sharing borders with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyzstan in the south, Kazakhstan is inevitably and fully involved in the transnational flow which requires interstates cooperation and collaboration concerning water allocation and sharing.

The Challenges of Water Scarcity and Uneven Distribution

A set of environmental problems expand towards this delimited territory to the national level, hindering the ecological and socio-economic balance of the entire country, especially affecting population’s health and human development.

The country faces problem of water scarcity in terms of surface and ground water, which makes the Aral Sea one of the four major hydrologic regions, together with the Ob river, the Caspian Sea basin, and Lake Balkhash. Water consumption is the main cause of basin’s exploitation and draining, as the total annual water withdrawal (21.143 km3 in 2010) is mainly allocated for agriculture (66%) including irrigation, livestock and aquaculture; municipal (4%); and industry (30%) (FAO Aquastat, 2012). The Syr Darya’s water is mainly used for intensive irrigation, especially in Kyzylorda and Almaty southern provinces, where 90% of overall irrigation water is used (FAO Aquastat, 2012).

The country struggles with water accessibility, especially in the western and south-western regions with a high fresh-water deficit, worsened by a gradual river runoff reduction (Medeu, Malkovskiy and Toleubayeva, n.d.). It is estimated that transboundary hydrological risks will inevitably lead to reduction of the river flow in Kazakhstan in 2020 to 81.6 km³ per year (Medeu, Malkovskiy and Toleubayeva, n.d.).

Source: Cawater-info (2017). Water withdrawal and availability.

The uneven distribution of water resources across the country is evident due to the disparity between yearly availability of water resources of 70,000 m³/km² in the south-east to 6,500 – 8000 m³/km² in the central and northern part of Kazakhstan (Medeu, Malkovskiy and Toleubayeva, n.d., p. 193). This shows a significant impact as the yearly individual consumption of fresh water should not be less than 5,000 m³, but in most regions of Kazakhstan just 700-1000 m³ per year is available (Medeu, Malkovskiy and Toleubayeva, n.d.).

The problems of water scarcity and uneven allocation of water resources in Kazakhstan are aggravated by anthropogenic factors, such as socio-economic activities at high water consumption.

The Impacts of Desertification and Land Degradation

Another crucial water management challenge in the area is linked to the irrigation system. The level and volume of the Aral Sea has dramatically decreased, mainly because of irrigation development upstream, especially after a massive irrigation program promoted by the Soviet Union to support monoculture cotton production in desert lands (Peachey, 2004, p. 2-3). This has resulted in environmental and climate change problems, which have been tentatively addressed by the Central Asia Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC): desertification, land degradation, excessive water salinization, water and air pollution (FAO Aquastat, 2012). They all have dangerous impacts on the ecosystem of the area, causing decline of the region’s biological and socio-economic potential.

The main zones of land degradation, estimated to comprise 66% of the total territory, are concentrated in the Caspian regions and especially in the Aral basin, where desertification problems are combined with radioactive pollution (Saigal, 2003, p.4). Here ecosystem and human health are strongly affected by the pollution of water and dried soils, having absorbed radioactive materials during USSR nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk, pesticides used for intensive cotton production, PCB-compounds and heavy metals (Peachey, 2004, p. 4). The long-term exposure to polluted water and soil puts the Kazakh population at risk for infectious diseases, increasing infant mortality rate, and declining life expectancy (Peachey, 2004, p. 4).

Source: Cawater info (2017). Desertification and Land Degradation

Since “the Blue Gold” (Barlow, 2001) is crucial for subsistence, development and production growth, the challenges posed by the shrinking of the Aral Sea generate prospects of inevitable Gross National Income (GNI) reduction and export rate drop. In the social context, water scarcity and environmental problems worsen social tensions, increase inequality and aggravate the level of poverty, as “poverty incidence ranges between 45 and 87 % in environmentally unfavorable areas” (Saigal, 2003, p. 2).

Commitment to water conservation and efficiency policies are required to mitigate potential tensions and to make the demands of natural and technogenic and anthropogenic systems sustainable. For instance, the “Strategy Kazakhstan-2050” program, promoted by the President Nusultan Nazarbayev, aims to position Kazakhstan among the top global 30 global economies by 2050 in a sustainable way (Medeu, Malkovskiy, and Toleubayeva, n.d., p.189). The water resources management program approved by Decree n. 786 has a focus on planning, monitoring and assessment operations to address water crisis challenges (Medeu, Malkovskiy, and Toleubayeva, n.d., p.189)

The evidence of long-term risks on environment, society, economics and human development should lead the Kazakh government to develop a stronger commitment to water conservation policies, transboundary cooperation, and partnerships between a variety of institutions and organizations in order to face potential regional conflicts.

Potential for Cooperation and Risk of Conflict

After the fall of the USSR in 1991, the five main nations around the Aral Sea became independent and, lacking an enforcement agency, experienced issues of how to cooperate regarding the common good that is the Aral Sea Basin. Downstream nations, who had earlier provided energy for upstream nations during the winter months in exchange for water to come down during the summer months, began selling their energy resources of gas, oil and coal to other nations for an increased economic gain. (ECC, 2017). The downstream nations quickly moved away from the earlier sustainable system that the USSR implemented for the region, a system that only worked with cooperation. For example, Kazakhstan failed to meet the energy production quota required by Kyrgyzstan, who then decided to cut waterflow into the basin as a direct reaction (ECC, 2017). The states valued national short term gain more than regional cooperation.

As the Aral Sea shrank and water became scarce, conflict occurred between the border states during the 1990’s, which Elhance shows in his text Conflict and Cooperation over water in the Aral Sea basin by highlighting three examples of interstate conflict (1997, p. 217):

  1. Armed conflict between Kyrgyz and Tajiks in Kyrgyzstan over water resources in the summer of 1989.

  2. Over 300 people died in a dispute over land and water in the Osh Region between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1990.

  3. A report hinted about plans for Uzbek military to invade Turkmenistan in 1995 due to wasteful water allegations.

Elhance explains that Kazakhstan was one of the most affected countries by the drying up of the Aral Sea, arguing that the little water that Kazakhstan used to receive from the Amu Darya is heavily polluted by pesticides and chemicals due to the Uzbek agriculture (Elhance, 1997, p. 217). This pollution, along with salt storms and chemicals from the now exposed seabed, made the water a leading cause of diseases, such as Tuberculosis, plague and increased risk of cancer (Micklin, 2010). This forced many Kazakhstani people to migrate or to change their way of life to survive. Since the Aral Sea dried up, some inhabitants of Kazakhstan have turned to breeding camels (BBC, 2015).. However, the chemicals and salinity affect the animals as well as the plants, rendering it harmful to harvest and use grounds for grazing (Micklin, 2010).To make matters worse, Kazakh land around the Aral Sea has been categorized as being in a high hazard level of drought, meaning that there is expected to be a drought at least every 5 years (Global Facility for Disaster reduction and Recovery, 2017). This causes an increased water scarcity risk, one that the communities cannot afford.

But, other than water scarcity, the people in Kazakhstan also have to face issues such as water policy reform, economic restructuring, growth of local terrorist organisations related to religion, drug trafficking, rising population density, and simmering hostility among different ethnic groups (Elhance, 1997, p. 217).

Although there are problems that could potentially lead to a large-scale conflict of devastating proportions, these problems don’t seem to be escalating into any sort of violent outcry, in fact the opposite is transpiring with visible signs of increased cooperation and improved regional relations (RFERL, 2017; The Diplomat, 2017; UNEP, 2014). This is due to the successful projects that are breathing life back into the Aral sea basin, especially along the northern part closest to Kazakhstan. The lack of information regarding dissent and local uprisings (such as political opposition, terror group recruitment, and violent unrest) could also be attributed to media censorships and national security forces subduing political opposition.

There has seemingly been progress in regional and international cooperation, such as the multilateral efforts to control Syr Darya’s flow into the Northern Aral Sea (NAS). Masood Ahmad commented that “The NAS project is a great success story.. It helped to improve the health and the living conditions of about one million people and reduce poverty in the region… We can’t save the Aral Sea.. But we have revived a part of it.” (Prbylovsky, n.d.).

The Future of the Aral Sea Basin

After discussing the Aral Sea basin itself, basin related problems, institutions of water governance, the resulting problems for involved states and the potential cooperation or conflict between these states, now the potential future scenarios of the Syr Darya and the Aral Sea basin will be analysed. These include several attempts of the local people to stop the desiccation of the Aral Sea, as well as the major attempt of the World Bank in cooperation with the Kazakhstan government to renew the northern part of the Aral Sea and the Syr Darya basin area. The main focus in this case is based on the Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea Project – Phase II, co-financed by the World Bank with a 165.80 million USD commitment and a total project cost of 325.80 million USD (World Bank, n.d.).

Before debating the World Bank project, it is of concern to point out some of the probable future scenarios of the Aral Sea basin and specifically of the Syr Darya area. One of these could be a complete dehydration of the northern and southern part of the Aral Sea, which is very unlikely due to the input of irrigation drainage water, groundwater, snowmelt and rainwater, which would at least maintain the lake on a fundamental level (Micklin 2016, p.7). The opposite of a complete dehydration, a full regeneration to the initial dimension of the Aral Sea from the 1960’s, is also improbable and would need an average annual river inflow of 56 km³ in a period of approximately 103 years (Micklin, 2014, p.361). Between 2000 to 2011, only 8,8 km³ flowed into the Aral Sea, roughly 16% of the amount of inflow required for a complete restoration (Micklin, 2014, p.361). However, a realistic amount of inflow to the northern Aral Sea has been estimated at 2,6 km³ per year to maintain the current level, with an additional 0,65 km³ enough to increase the surface and decrease the salinity (Micklin 2016, p. 7).

As previously mentioned in “Institutions of Water Governance,” the Syr Darya control and northern Aral Sea project (SYNAS) has shown satisfactory results in improving the overall environmental conditions and increasing human and animal biodiversity. Phase two of the SYNAS project is aiming to deepen and stabilize the outcome of the first project (Micklin 2016, p. 7). In 2012, a meeting was held by the Ministry of Agriculture with the participation of the World Bank on the organization of the further implementation for the second phase of SYNAS, where the World Bank agreed to subsidize the project with roughly 165 million USD (World Bank, n.d.). The main goals are defined as: stabilizing the inflow of the Syr Darya into the northern Aral with 3 km³ per year and holding the surface level at 42 m; reducing the salinity of the Syr Darya delta; reducing the soil salinity in the northern Aral Sea; increasing water quality; and restoring some of the primary food chains (Ministry of Agriculture Kazakhstan, 2014).

To achieve these goals, the project partners specified the following sub-projects:

  1. Repair and rehabilitation of the left bank irrigation offtake at Kzylorda barrage;

  2. Flood Protection Dikes construction in Kazalinsk and Karmakchi districts;

  3. Syr Darya river bed straightening at Korgansha and Turumbet sites at Zhalagash district;

  4. Construction of bridge near Birlik settlement in Kazalinsk district of Kzylorda oblast;

  5. Rehabilitation of Kamuishlibash and Akshatau lake systems in Aralsk district of Kzylorda oblast;

  6. Reconstruction and extension of nursery ponds at “Tastak” site of Kamuishlibash fish hatchery in Aralsk district of Kzylorda oblast.Also part of the SYNAS-2 project is developing two sub-projects.

The reconstruction of the Northern Aral Sea and the construction and equipping of the work center for water management in the Kazakh part of the Syr Darya Basin. (Ministry of Agriculture Kazakhstan, n.d.)

The above listed points aim (1) to ensure sustainable water supply of irrigated land; (2) to protect the local population and the infrastructure from periodic high winter water releases; (3) to establish general flood protections of bigger cities; (4) to build up infrastructure, e.g. the bridge near Birlik, to ensure reliable transport; (5) to rehabilitate lower lake systems of the Syr Darya and (6) to accelerate the recovery of fish productivity in the northern Aral Sea for new opportunities of development and the creation of new jobs for local people (Ministry of Agriculture Kazakhstan, n.d.).


The Aral Sea Basin represents a controversial area in which challenges and opportunities regarding water scarcity determine the sustainable development of several countries involved. It is one of the most important water sources in Central Asia, which is essential for 35 million people inhabiting the region and drains from seven different countries that are otherwise dominated by desert.

Water governance and management promoted at local, national and international levels by domestic and international institutions have become increasingly necessary. Kazakhstan, spanned by the Aral Sea in the southwest border, has engaged in major efforts within Central Asia to develop effective strategies and prompt interstate cooperation.

As analysed in the previous sections, environmental challenges like salinization and desertification hinder the ecological, socio-economic and human development potential of the countries. Although efforts to overcome current tensions and risks to enable cooperation have been introduced, much more commitment is necessary to restrict and/or regulate water consumption. Predictions for the future suggest that current water usage will not be sustainable in the future, so the international cooperation that has begun is critical for this population’s survival.


  • Al Jazeera. 2016. Aral Sea Spring back to life. Available at: [Accessed 23 November]
  • Aramcoworld. 2015. Available at:
  • Barlow, B., 2001. Council of Canadians Chair, IFG Committee on the Globalization of Water, Blue Gold, The Global Water Crisis and the Commodification of the World’s Water Supply.
  • BBC. 2015. Aral Sea: The sea that dried up in 40 years – BBC News. Available at: [2017-11-18]
  • Cawater info. 2017. Available at:
  • ECC, Environment Conflict and Cooperation. 2017. Conflict over the water in the aral sea. Available at: [2017-11-20]
  • Elhance, A. 1997. Conflict and cooperation over water in the Aral Sea basin. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 20:2, 207-218, DOI: 10.1080/10576109708436034. p. 217.
  • Eurasianet. 2012. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan: Differing Approaches on the Aral Sea. Available at:
  • FAO 2012. Aquastat Kazakhstan. Available at: [Accessed 26 November 2017]
  • FAO 2016. Kazakhstan country profile. Available at: [Accessed: 26 November 2017]
  • Granit, J., A. Jägerskog, R. Löfgren, A. Bullock, G. de Gooijer, S. Pettigrew, and A. Lindström, 2010. Regional Water Intelligence Report Central Asia Baseline. [pdf] Stockholm: United Nations Development Programme. Available at: [Accessed 15 November 2017].
  • Global Facility for disaster reduction and recovery. ThinkHazard. 2017. Water Scarcity. Available at:
  • Letolle, R. and Mainguet, M., 1998. Human-made Desertification in the Aral Sea Basin: Planning and Management Failures in the Arid Frontier. Bruins H.J., Lithwick H. (eds),, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 129-142.
  • Lioubimtseva, E 2015, ‘A multi-scale assessment of human vulnerability to climate change in the Aral Sea basin’, Environmental Earth Science, vol. 73, pp. 719-729.
  • Medeu, A.R., Malkovskiy, I.M., Toleubayeva, L.S., n.d. Institute of Geography LLP, Almaty, Kazakhstan: Principles of water resources management in Kazakhstan, in ch. Water Resources of Central Asia and Their Use., pp. 189-200
  • Micklin, P. 2010. Desiccation of the Aral Sea: A Water Management Disaster of the Soviet Union. Department of Geography, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI. Available at: [2017-11-23]
  • Micklin, P. Aladin, NV. and Plotnikov I. (ed.), 2014. “The Aral Sea: The Devastation and Partial Rehabilitation of a Great Lake.” Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
  • Micklin, P., 2016. The future Aral Sea: hope and despair. In: Environ Earth Sci (2016) 75:844
  • Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. 2017. Kazakh, Uzbek Leaders Hail Improving Ties at Tashkent Meeting. Avalible at: [2017-11-22]
  • Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2012. ANNOTATION for feasibility study of Second Phase of the “Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea” Project (SYNAS-2),
  • Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014. Kazakhstan – Second Phase of the “Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea” Project (SYNAS-2) Environmental Assessment and Management framework. Available at: [Accessed 24 November 2017]
  • Peachey, E. J., 2004. The Aral sea Basin crisis and Sustainable water resource management in Central Asia. Available at: [Accessed 26 November 2017]
  • Prbylovsky, P. n.d. Revival of the Aral Sea: Kazakh and World Efforts to Resotre the Island Sea.Avalible at: [2017-11-25]
  • Small, I, Upshur, REG & Van der Meer, J 2001, ‘Acting on an Environmental Health Disaster:
  • The Case of the Aral Sea’, Environmental Health Perspectives, vol. 109, no. 6, pp. 547-549.
  • Saigal, S., 2003. Kazakhstan: Issues and Approaches to Combat Desertification. Available at: [Accessed 26 November 2017]
  • Siteforsoreeyes. (n.d). Land of the Kazakhs. Avalible at: [2017-11-25}
  • The World Bank, n.d. Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea Project – Phase II. Available at: [Accessed 24 November 2017]
  • The Diplomat. 2017. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the hope of Regionalism. Available at: [2017-11-22]
  • UNEP. 2014. The Future of the Aral Sea Lies in Transboundary co-operation. Available at: [2017-11-23]
  • Volovik, Y., 2011. Overview of Regional Transboundary Water Agreements, Institutions, and Relevant Legal/Policy Activities in Central Asia: Promoting Integrated Water Resources Management and Fostering Transboundary Dialogue in Central Asia. [pdf] European Union and United Nations Development Programme. Available at: [Accessed 13 November 2017].
  • World Bank 1998, Aral Sea Basin Program (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) Water and Environmental Management Project, Project Document, viewed 20 November 2017, retrieved from
  • World Bank. (2005). Saving a corner of the world. Avalible at: [2017-11-24]
  • World Bank, 2011. Implementation Completion and Results Report (IBRD-46090 TF-56801) on a Loan in the Amount of US$ 64.50 Million to the Republic of Kazakhstan for a Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea Phase-1 Project. [pdf] Available at: [Accessed 13 November 2017].
Share on facebook
Share on twitter
Share on linkedin
Share on whatsapp
Share on email

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Related publications